look at what i found on another forum this is fucking ridiculous lmao..
First, I calculated the league average OBP and SLG for the AL 1914-34 and NL 1935, and did the same for the NL 1986-2001. I excluded sacrifice flies from the OBP calculations in order to be consistent; they aren’t available for Ruth’s time. This is what I found:
Ruth’s league OBP: .342
Ruth’s league SLG: .381
Bonds’s league OBP: .330
Bonds’s league SLG: .400
I then adjusted these slightly for park effects. I used a park factor of .975 for Ruth and a park factor of .966 for Bonds; these were just the unweighted averages for the Total Baseball park factors for each year of their respective careers:
Ruth’s adjusted league OBP: .334
Ruth’s adjusted league SLG: .371
Bonds’s adjusted league OBP: .319
Bonds’s adjusted league SLG: .387
I then divided Ruth’s OBP of .474 and SLG of .690 by his adjusted league averages, and Bonds’s OBP of .422 (ignoring sacrifice flies) and SLG of .585 by his adjusted league averages. This gave me their relative OBP and SLG:
Ruth’s relative OBP: 1.419
Ruth’s relative SLG: 1.859
Bonds’s relative OBP: 1.323
Bonds’s relative SLG: 1.511
To put them into the same context, I calculated the overall averages for the AL 1914-34 and the NL 1935 and 1986-2001, all put together. This gave me a reasonable baseline that shouldn’t favor either player:
Average league OBP: .335
Average league SLG: .392
Average league TB/H: 1.471 (I’ll use this in my fielding analysis.)
Average league SB%: .645 (I’ll need this later, too.)
Multiplying their relative averages by these numbers gives these adjusted averages:
Ruth’s adjusted OBP: .476
Ruth’s adjusted SLG: .728
Bonds’s adjusted OBP: .444
Bonds’s adjusted SLG: .592
Ruth had fifteen full seasons as a regular outfielder with at least 100 games in the outfield (actually, at least 110). Bonds has also had fifteen such seasons (actually, with at least 112 games in the outfield). The average number of plate appearances (actually, AB+BB+HBP) for these two players in these thirty seasons was 617. In those full seasons, Ruth played in about 92% of his teams games; Bonds, about 93%. I made a very slight adjustment to account for this, applying Ruth’s adjusted OBP and SLG to 616 PA, and Bonds’s to 618 PA. I assumed that, given a certain number of times reaching base, each player’s ratio of hits to walks to HBP would be the same as what they achieved in real life. This gives us:
Ruth: 169 hits for 358 total bases, with 122 walks and 2 HBP in 616 plate appearances.
Bonds: 155 hits for 295 total bases, with 115 walks and 4 HBP in 618 plate appearances.
The difference between these performances is that Ruth has 14 hits, 49 extra bases, and 7 walks, while Bonds has 2 HBP and 21 outs. Using the linear weights values from Total Baseball (hit = .47, extra base = .31, walk = .33, HBP = .33, out = -.27), we can estimate the difference between their performances at 29 runs. That is, Ruth’s hitting is worth, in a neutral context, about 29 runs a year as compared to Bonds’s hitting.
I performed a similar analysis on their base-stealing statistics:
Ruth’s league SB%: .567
Bonds’s league SB%: .691
Ruth’s SB%: .485
Bonds’s SB%: .778
Ruth’s relative SB%: .855
Bonds’s relative SB%: 1.125
Ruth’s adjusted SB%: .552
Bonds’s adjusted SB%: .726
I assumed that they would attempt to steal at the same rate they did in real life, looking only at those seasons when they were regular outfielders:
Ruth had 16 SBA per 616 PA (I used Ruth’s 1919 SB total and his career SB% to estimate 14 attempts for 1919, for which CS data is unavailable).
Bonds has had 40 SBA per 618 PA.
This gives us the following estimates:
Ruth: 9 SB, 7 CS
Bonds: 29 SB, 11 CS
The difference is that Bonds has 20 more stolen bases and 4 more times caught. Again using the linear weights values from Total Baseball (SB = .22, CS = -.35), we can estimate the base-stealing advantage for Bonds at 3 runs a year.
Combined with hitting, this gives us an estimated offensive advantage for Ruth of 26 runs per year.
Then I looked at defense. Using data from the 2nd edition of STATS All-Time Major League Handbook and from the 2001 and 2002 annual editions of STATS Major League Handbook, and using the adjustment figures that Tom Howell posted elsewhere for estimating the league range factors and fielding percentages for left-, center-, and rightfielders, we find:
Ruth’s league RF: 2.17
Ruth’s league FPct: .962
Bonds’s league RF: 2.05 (this is probably a little high; I only had RF for regulars for 2000 and 2001)
Bonds’s league FPct: .978 (probably a little high for the same reason)
Ruth’s RF: 2.16
Ruth’s FPct: .968
Bonds’s RF: 2.21
Bonds’s FPct: .984
Ruth’s relative RF: .995
Ruth’s relative FPct: 1.0059
Bonds’s relative RF: 1.078
Bonds’s relative FPct: 1.0063
As a neutral context, I used the averages for the leagues and seasons in both of their careers combined:
Average RF: 2.11
Average FPct: .970
This gives us:
Ruth’s adjusted RF: 2.10
Ruth’s adjusted FPct: .976
Bonds’s adjusted RF: 2.27
Bonds’s adjusted FPct: .976
In their thirty combined seasons as regular outfielders, they averaged 140.2 games in the outfield. Again making a very slight adjustment for actual playing time, I estimated their performances, in a neutral context. I assumed that given a certain number of successful plays, each player’s ratio of putouts to assists would be the same as they actually achieved in real life:
Ruth: 140 games, 281 putouts, 13 assists, 7 errors
Bonds: 141 games, 310 putouts, 10 assists, 8 errors
The difference is that Bonds has 29 putouts instead of 29 hits (accounting for 43 total bases, given the average league TB/H for their careers). Ruth has 3 extra assists, resulting in three outs on the bases. Bonds has one extra error.
Retrosheet’s website has play-by-play for the first 28 errors of Bonds’s career. A majority of these have the effect of adding an extra base to a hit (usually changing a single into, effectively, a double), so I assumed that that would be the type of error that Bonds’s extra one would be.
Applying Total Baseball’s linear weights (hit = .47, extra base = .31, out = -.27, out on base = -.50), we can estimate the fielding advantage for Bonds at 24 runs a year.
Finally, I considered their positions. I used the average batting runs by position from Total Baseball’s glossary (actually, the numbers are off slightly, so I got the correct figures from Pete Palmer). I averaged the numbers for LF, CF, and RF for any season in which either Bonds or Ruth played one of those positions. I found these average positional adjustments:
Average LF positional adjustment = 7.796
Average CF positional adjustment = 4.681
Average RF positional adjustment = 10.928
Their outfield playing time is split up this way:
Ruth: LF, 46.9%, CF, 2.7%, RF, 50.4%
Bonds: LF, 92.7%, CF, 7.2%, RF, 0.1%
Applying these positional adjustments, using these percentages, we can estimate a positional advantage for Bonds of 2 runs a year.
Combined with his fielding advantage, this gives a defensive advantage for Bonds of 26 runs per year.
To sum up:
Offensive advantage for Ruth = 26 runs/year
Defensive advantage for Bonds = 26 runs/year
You may quibble with the details of my analysis; I’ve tried to be as fair as possible. If I were to do things somewhat differently here and there, the scales might tip slightly in favor of one player or the other. I think it is clear, however, that the two of them are very, very close.
How, then, to separate them? One thing I don’t do is give Ruth extra credit for pitching, because he was more valuable as an outfielder. His ability to pitch as well as hit at such a high level is indicative of tremendous baseball talent, but it doesn’t make him more valuable—and as far as I’m concerned, value is what’s important in this exercise. Others may disagree with this choice, but I think we can all see that he would have been worth more to the Red Sox if he’d been an outfielder from the start.
I separate them by asking this question: which of these two players would be more likely to dominate the competition in this average setting to the same extent as they did when they were active? That is, which player performed at such a high level against tougher competition?
To me, the answer is obvious.
The answer is Barry Bonds, the greatest baseball player of them all.