People seem inclined to argue in favor of same-sex marriage for a variety of reasons. Presently the argument of the proponent of same-sex marriage is popularly framed in the public arena as being equivalent to the issue of racial civil rights. It is suggested that our obligation to recognize same-sex marriage is a moral one, and that this obligation derives from an underlying moral principle similar to that moral principle from which it is suggested derives our moral obligation to recognize rights independently of race.
Anywhere from the Massachusetts Supreme Court to the comments of television pundits we see this moral principle rendered as being generally to the effect:
P1: "If recognition of type of marriage t does not fail to be rational, and further if recognition of t is desired by some in a partnership having the composition of t, then we have a moral obligation to recognize with marriage of type t that partnership so desiring."
Some opponents of same-sex marriage suggest that this will require us to recognize variously: pedophilia, bestiality, polygamy, and incest. However, proponents of same-sex marriage have recently developed and popularized a set of talking-point responses to each of these suggestions:
a) To polygamy they will respond that they are only immediately interested in the equal recognition of partnerships of consenting adults of male-male and female-female composition in the already existing institution of marriage between two consenting adults, because these partnerships of male-male and female-female composition are equally partnerships between two consenting adults.
b) To each pedophilia and bestiality they respond similarly that such partnerships are not between consenting adults, alluding to the suggestion that both partnerships involve at least one member who morally can not give his or her or its informed consent to such a partnership.
c) To incest they recount what has long been known that incestuous biological reproduction has a greater chance on the whole (and per capita) of producing offspring with genetic, hereditary defects or illnesses than on the whole does non-incestuous biological reproduction. Hence, suggests the proponent of same-sex marriage, we have a rational basis for the restriction of the recognition with marriage of incestuous partnerships.
The weakest of these points, and what I would suggest is on the average or best case indefensible, is case (c): recognition with marriage of incestuous partnerships between consenting adults. Not only is this point the most productive to attack because of its general indefensibility, but also because agreement in the public sphere is almost universal that incestuous marriage is wrong and also that we know we have no moral obligation to recognize an incestuous partnership with marriage, even if that marriage it is desired by an incestuous partnership of two consenting adults.
Now, before we begin, it is important to realize the limitations of our offensive. Most notably, attacking the point of incestuous marriage between consenting adults in private or on in relatively anonymous forum will not generally be successful, for not surprisingly at all given the courage granted by this perception of anonymity, certain committed individuals will discover an unnatural proclivity to "bitting the bullet", i.e. they will simply respond to you that so far as they are concerned, incestuous marriage between consenting adults is morally defensible or is somehow otherwise acceptable. While there are certain twisted individuals among us who no doubt have deluded themselves into genuinely holding such a position, it is in the overwhelming part the case that perceiving their relative anonymity, some individuals will offer this retort to inflate their pride and to obtain some illusion of power by thinking they have turned the weaker argument into the stronger.
Such individuals are not immediately your concern, and if addressed at all, should be addressed in the public sphere where they will cower and cringe in the light of their peers and superiors as the prideful and deviant creatures they are, ashamed of their inferior and false positions. Do not cast your pearls to swine.
While no doubt it may not have occurred to you due to the undesirable nature of the subject matter, it should become quite obvious that the genetic pool argument alluded to in (c), is completely impotent for those incestuous partnerships between consenting adults having any of the following compositions:
- Male-male incestuous partnerships.
- Female-female incestuous partnerships.
- Male-female incestuous partnerships where one or both members are past child-bearing age or otherwise sterile.
- Male-female incestuous partnerships which choose not to reproduce as presently do many heterosexual partnerships which we have as a society deemed is not reason to deny the recognition of marriage to such partnerships.
- Male-female incestuous partnerships which choose adoption or to use a surrogate mother as presently do many heterosexual partnerships which we as a society have deemed is not reason to deny the recognition of marriage to such partnerships, and also are the only means presently available to homosexual partnerships to have children.
On the terms of the proponents of same-sex marriage, there is no sufficient, defensible, rational basis on which to restrict the recognition of marriage for incestuous partnerships having any of the preceding compositions.
While this illustration alone is adequate for our following purposes, first we may optionally proceed to address the defensibility of the alleged rational basis for restriction of the recognition of marriage for male-female incestuous relationships capable of or interested in biological reproduction.
Now, to be sure, the mere possibility of defective biological reproduction is not alone sufficient to restrict the recognition with marriage of such partnerships, because we recognize with marriage heterosexual partnerships regardless of predisposition to genetic and hereditary diseases or deficiencies in any or both partners. To do otherwise, we realize, would – in however limited a capacity it may be – to implement a government enforced program of eugenics. But this is not the only appeal we may make. Incestuous biological reproduction is not intrinsically defective, deficient, or disease prone. In the case that there are hereditary defects or illnesses coded for in the genes of both partners, there is significant risk of these defects or diseases being passed to the offspring produced, but this is similarly the case with non-incestuous heterosexual partnerships in which both partners share the aforementioned genetic particularities. The possibility of hereditary defects or illnesses in a single-generation incestuous relationship are negligible by present standards and are not sufficient in the general case to constitute a rational basis for the restriction of the recognition of male-female incestuous partnerships between consenting adults, even in the case that such a partnerships chooses biological reproduction.
Recall moral principle (P1):
P1: "If recognition of type of marriage t does not fail to be rational, and further if recognition of t is desired by some in a partnership having the composition of t, then we have a moral obligation to recognize with marriage of type t that partnership so desiring."
That as we have demonstrated there is no rational basis for the restriction of the recognition with marriage of incestuous partnerships between consenting adults, satisfies part (1) of active moral principle (P1) – the principle appealed to popularly in the public sphere by proponents of same-sex marriage.
Part (2) of moral principle (P1) is also satisfied. It is the case that there are incestuous partnerships between consenting adults, who desire, or given the public forum for expressing such desire, do wish their relationships or partnerships to be recognized with marriage.
Of course, given how extensively we denigrate, ridicule, persecute, and expression the intention to persecute, prosecute, and jail those engaged in such loving and mutually affirmative partnerships, there should be no surprise that public expressions of such relationships are rare, or that under such tremendous negative social pressure, such relationships are often prone to difficulties, complications, abandonment, or failure. No doubt this situation has many similarities with struggles faced by same-sex relationships in times past. For all these reasons of which we are guilty – we might say – we have also (were their behave actually morally permissible) some moral obligation to give such individuals the benefit of the doubt.
Further, proponents of same-sex marriage are quick to remind us that popular opinion does not matter in the case of such a fundamental human right as that of two consenting adults in a loving and affirmative relationship to have their relationship recognized in marriage when they so desire.
It is clear then, that both part (1) and part (2) of moral principle (P1) are satisfied. That is to say, on the grounds of moral principle (P1) just as proponents of same-sex marriage argue we have a moral obligation to recognize same-sex partnerships with marriage, we similarly have a moral obligation to recognize with marriage at least those incestuous partnerships of best-case compositions, and arguable all incestuous partnerships between consenting adults.
However, as decent and right-thinking people know that we do not have a moral obligation to recognize incestuous partnerships with marriage. The public at large knows this too. Anyone who says otherwise, we know, is simply wrong. They have failed to properly ascertain the truth of the matter. They are abnormally defective in their epistemic and moral capacities (the same thing can be said in many ways).
Therefore, by proof by contradiction, we know that on the grounds of moral principle (P1) we do not in fact have a moral obligation to recognize same-sex partnerships with marriage, because if moral principle (P1) were not defective, then we would have a moral obligation to recognize incestuous partnerships with marriage, and we know that we have no such obligation.
Now, it may be that on some other grounds – not grounds (P1) – that we have a moral obligation to recognize same-sex partnerships with marriage, but no such alternative grounds has been presented, advanced, or popularized in the public sphere, and as such we may conclude, having proved that grounds (P1) is deficient, at least I suggest that we do not seem to have before us any pressing moral obligation to recognize same-sex partnerships with marriage.
And of course, anyone who chooses as they might think a potential refutation to suggest in the public arena that we have a moral obligation to recognize incestuous partnerships with marriage, we and the public know to be wrong and know to not be credible in moral matters.
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